Copyright 2022 by William D. Araiza

Printed in U.S.A.
Vol. 116, No. 5

Essay
DISGUST AND GUNS: CONDUCT, IDENTITY, AND
SECOND AMENDMENT ANIMUS
William D. Araiza
ABSTRACT—In Second Amendment Animus, Professor Jacob Charles
examines whether the burgeoning doctrine of unconstitutional animus
should play any role in adjudicating Second Amendment claims. This Essay
responds to Professor Charles’s important work. While it concludes that he
is likely correct to reject animus as a grounding for Second Amendment
claims, it points out areas where the analysis is more nuanced than he
suggests. After considering Professor Charles’s analysis, the Essay examines
the Second Amendment animus issue through the theoretical lens provided
by Professor Martha Nussbaum’s work on disgust as a motivating factor for
the types of exclusionary and subordinating laws properly condemned as
grounded in animus. While that examination again concludes that animus is
generally a poor fit for Second Amendment claims, the Essay nevertheless
identifies fascinating parallels between at least some extreme gun regulations
and characteristics of some laws condemned as animus based. Those
parallels suggest that more work should be done to investigate the connection
between animus-based laws and the disgust reactions Professor Nussbaum
identifies as their source. In particular, more work is needed to examine how
Professor Nussbaum’s theory relates to laws that, while connected to disgust
reactions, are not squarely grounded in them.
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INTRODUCTION
As Professor Jacob Charles writes in his thought-provoking essay,
Second Amendment Animus, “The concept of animus truly ‘is having its
moment in the sun.’”1 Professor Charles’s contribution to the “flourishing”
scholarship on animus consists of examining its applicability to three
different potential targets of unconstitutional animus relevant to the Second
Amendment: animus against guns themselves, against gun owners, and
against gun rights. After Part I introduces the issue, Part II considers
Professor Charles’s analysis on its own terms. It concludes that, while
fundamentally correct, his rejection of any role for animus in Second
Amendment doctrine may be slightly too categorical.
In order to provide conceptual nuance glossed over by Professor
Charles’s categorical rejection, Part III introduces into the discussion legal
philosopher Martha Nussbaum’s explanation of animus and applies her
theory to the Second Amendment animus question.2 Professor Nussbaum’s
careful consideration of the concept of disgust, and how it feeds into
discriminatory and exclusionary government decision-making, carries great
potential for understanding the proper domain for claims of unconstitutional
animus. Even though Second Amendment animus claims fit poorly with her
focus on innate disgust reactions, a thought experiment applying her
description of animus-based government action to gun restrictions raises

1

Jacob D. Charles, Second Amendment Animus, 116 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2021) (quoting Katie R.
Eyer, Animus Trouble, 48 STETSON L. REV. 215, 215 (2019)).
2 Part III primarily focuses on Professor Nussbaum’s discussion in two books: MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2010)
[hereinafter NUSSBAUM, DISGUST], and MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST,
SHAME, AND THE LAW (2004) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, HIDING].
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fascinating parallels between government actions the Supreme Court has
condemned as resting on animus and the most extreme exemplars of gun
regulation.3 Those parallels may not justify importing animus into the
Second Amendment; Professor Charles provides sensible reasons for
rejecting that path. Nevertheless, those parallels reveal the need for more
examination of the theoretical foundation for animus doctrine and, in
particular, the relationship between that foundation and Professor
Nussbaum’s focus on disgust.
I.

ANIMUS EVERYWHERE?

Professor Charles’s analysis of animus doctrine’s relationship to
Second Amendment claims rests on both his sense that animus is
“flourishing” as a legal concept and his recognition that judges and anti-gun
regulation forces often rely on some version of that concept to critique gun
regulations.4 Of course, these two pillars of his analysis are related: the
prominent role animus analysis has played in high-stakes constitutional
litigation over the last decade makes it an attractive tool to grasp if one
believes that a particular right or group suffers from majoritarian
disparagement.
As to the first of these pillars, Professor Charles is surely correct to cite
the growth of animus-related analysis in constitutional jurisprudence. If
animus were a stock, analysts would rate it a “buy.” As he notes, its domain
has broadened: from its original doctrinal home in the Equal Protection
Clause,5 it spread to Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause
jurisprudence,6 along the way adapting to reflect those clauses’ doctrinal
frameworks, before reentering equal protection soil in the 2020 case

3 To be sure, some readers may find troubling the very idea of a parallel between animus toward
guns, gun owners, and gun rights and the sexual-orientation- and disability-based discrimination that was
condemned as animus based in canonical animus cases. Such readers may find the historical
discrimination, subordination, and state-sponsored violence against such groups to raise a categorically
different issue than any discrimination that might attend Second Amendment-related conduct or status.
See, e.g., Todd Brower, “A Stranger to Its Laws:” Homosexuality, Schemas, and the Lessons and Limits
of Reasoning by Analogy, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 65, 87 (1997) (implying a difference between sexual
minorities and gun owners in terms of whether each group features “any common, collective existence or
identity”). Nevertheless, judges’ and advocates’ invocation of animus-style reasoning in Second
Amendment cases raises the issue of such reasoning’s proper place in those cases and justifies considering
those arguments.
4 Charles, supra note 1, at 6.
5 See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
6 See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
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reversing the Trump Administration’s DACA rescission, Department of
Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California.7
As reflected by its expansion into new doctrinal areas, animus doctrine
is also resilient. It has survived both the demise of the suspect class analysis
that accompanied its original introduction into equal protection law8 and the
retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy, who wrote the equal protection and
religious freedom opinions that constitute the heart of the contemporary
animus canon.9 When Justice Kennedy retired from the Court in 2018,
commentators had good reason to wonder whether that doctrinal tool would
be retired along with him.10 Nevertheless, two years after his retirement, the
Court in Regents picked up the idea.11 To be sure, Regents rejected the
plaintiffs’ animus claim.12 Nevertheless, as I have argued elsewhere, the fact
the Court even addressed the animus claim was noteworthy, given that it had
already ruled for the plaintiffs on a different ground.13 Indeed, not only did

7 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1915–16 (2020) (plurality opinion). Although this part of the Chief Justice’s
opinion spoke only for a four-Justice plurality, Justice Sotomayor’s partial concurrence and partial dissent
appeared to accept the framework of the plurality’s animus analysis, even if she disagreed with how the
plurality applied it. Her opinion thus created a five-Justice majority for its statement of the law governing
the plaintiffs’ animus claim. See id. at 1917 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment
in part, and dissenting in part).
8 The Court has not added to the list of suspect or quasi-suspect classes since at least the 1980s, and
likely the 1970s. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 503 & n.88
(2004) (noting and considering this chronology); see also Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection,
124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 756–57 (2011) (noting the “antiquated air” of current attempts to argue that
additional groups should be accorded suspect or quasi-suspect status). Not coincidentally, City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, arguably the Supreme Court’s last robust performance of suspect
class analysis, was decided in the plaintiffs’ favor despite the Court’s rejection of plaintiffs’ suspect class
argument because the Court decided that the government’s action was infected by animus. See 473 U.S.
432, 450 (1985) (“The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an
irrational prejudice against the [intellectually disabled] . . . .”).
9 See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731–32 (2018); United States
v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769–74 (2013); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–35 (1996).
10 See, e.g., Brendan Beery, Rational Basis Loses Its Bite: Justice Kennedy’s Retirement Removes
the Most Lethal Quill from LGBT Advocates’ Equal Protection Quiver, 69 SYRACUSE L. REV. 69, 71–72
(2019) (stating that “with Justice Kennedy off the Court and replaced by a social conservative more likely
of a mind with Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch,
[heightened rational basis review]—a powerful and lethal quill—will likely be removed from LGBT
rights advocates’ quiver”). To be sure, Professor Beery spoke of heightened rationality review. See id. at
74–76. However, elsewhere in his article he made clear his understanding that such review was often
triggered by a finding of animus, and the Court has not subjected such claims sounding in animus to
explicitly heightened scrutiny. See id. at 86–88.
11 See Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1915–16 (plurality opinion).
12 See id. at 1916.
13 See William D. Araiza, Regents: Resurrecting Animus/Renewing Discriminatory Intent, 51 SETON
HALL L. REV. 983, 1001–07 (2021).
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the four-Justice plurality address the animus claim, a five-Justice majority
provided a roadmap for how plaintiffs could raise such claims in the future.14
Given animus doctrine’s spread and resilience, good reason exists for
Professor Charles to consider animus a plausible doctrinal tool in Second
Amendment cases. That plausibility only grows when one recognizes that
Second Amendment plaintiffs, and the judges who hear their claims, often
lament the disparagement allegedly lying at the heart of gun regulations and
the court opinions upholding them.15 To use Professor Sanford Levinson’s
term in his groundbreaking 1989 article,16 this rhetoric accuses judges of
considering the Second Amendment an “embarrassment,” acknowledging a
right that the text requires be acknowledged but nevertheless providing it
only grudging protection. Indeed, even the Court that embraced the
individual right understanding of the amendment in 200817 and incorporated
that right against the states in 201018 was later criticized for failing to grant
review of a meaningful Second Amendment case until 202019 and then
dismissing it as moot.20 Alleged distaste for the Second Amendment extends
beyond courts to include citizens and legislative bodies that, if one believes

14

See supra note 7.
See, e.g., Charles, supra note 1, at 8 (quoting a judge complaining that “[t]o the rational observer,
it is apparent that our court just doesn’t like the Second Amendment very much” (quoting Mai v. United
States, 974 F.3d 1082, 1104–05 (9th Cir. 2020) (VanDyke, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc))); Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari) (“If a lower court treated another right so cavalierly, I have little doubt that this Court would
intervene. But . . . the Second Amendment is a disfavored right in this Court.”); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 25, Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945 (2017) (No. 17-342) (describing “the Ninth Circuit
and many other courts” as “openly hostile to the Second Amendment”).
16 See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 642 (1989) (“I
want to suggest that the [Second] Amendment may be profoundly embarrassing to many who both support
[gun] regulation and view themselves as committed to zealous adherence to the Bill of Rights . . . .”).
17 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
18 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).
19 See, e.g., Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Next Big Gun Case: The Resurrection of the Second Amendment
at the New Roberts Court, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 309, 341 (2018) (“The Court’s courage to hear tough cases
need not recede because the interpretive exercise is difficult, controversial, intimidating, or unpopular.
Yet, issue avoidance has become the Court’s status quo when it comes to the Second Amendment.”); see
also Philip Casey Grove, Common Use Under Fire: Kolbe v. Hogan and the Urgent Need for Clarity in
the Mass-Shooting Era, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 773, 802–03 (2017) (“Kolbe illuminates the lower courts’
continuing struggles with Heller’s common-use test and counsels heavily in favor of Supreme Court
review. . . . By any definition, therefore, the issue of the proper analytical approach to the common-use
test for resolving Second Amendment challenges has remained unsolved—despite nearly nine years of
the lower courts’ best efforts—and should be answered by the Supreme Court.”).
20 See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526 (2020) (per
curiam); id. at 1527 (Alito, J., dissenting) (critiquing that conclusion). However, the Court soon granted
certiorari in another Second Amendment case raising a similar issue. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v.
Corlett, 818 Fed. App’x 99 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 2566 (2021) (No. 20-843).
15
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the rhetoric, do everything they can to drive guns out of their communities.21
Given such data points, it is hardly surprising that gun-rights plaintiffs reach
for the animus cudgel.
II. WHAT TYPE OF ANIMUS?
But animus against what? Professor Charles explores three possibilities.
First, he considers whether one can coherently allege that gun regulations
rest on unconstitutional animus against guns themselves. Second, he
examines the possibility that such laws are motivated by animus against gun
owners. Finally, he considers whether they reflect animus against the Second
Amendment right itself. This Part reviews Professor Charles’s analysis and
advocates for more careful and nuanced consideration before dismissing
Second Amendment animus claims altogether. Part III then reconsiders these
claims in light of Professor Nussbaum’s analysis of animus doctrine’s roots
in disgust.
A. Animus Against Guns
Professor Charles makes short work of the first claim, dismissing the
possibility of animus against guns in two crisp paragraphs.22 Yet, while he is
on strong ground in rejecting the plausibility of anti-gun animus, his
argument is still somewhat incomplete. Focusing on the Constitution’s
protections for only a few physical things (most notably, the “papers[] and
effects” protected by the Fourth Amendment23), Professor Charles writes that
“if motive is relevant at all, it is to protect people or their use of these items,
not any concern over the items themselves.”24 After an intervening quotation,
he then writes, “Relatedly, there does not seem anything constitutionally
objectionable with legislative disdain for guns.”25
While Professor Charles rejects the plausibility of animus against guns
themselves, he at least entertains the possibility of “hoplophobia,” the
asserted condition of the fear of guns.26 More generally, there is interesting
ground to be covered on the general question of animus against things.
21 See, e.g., Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting a group of
homeowners opposing a permit for a gun store as being “opposed to guns and their ready availability and
therefore believ[ing] that gun shops should not be located within their community”), aff’d, 873 F.3d 670
(9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
22 See Charles, supra note 1, at 14–15.
23 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24 Charles, supra note 1, at 15.
25 Id.
26 See id. at 14–15 (considering “hoplophobia” claims); id. at 9 (linking use of this word to “pro-gun
circles”). Hereafter, this Essay uses this term without quotation marks, despite its potentially ideologically
skewed nature.
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Professor Nussbaum has written of the feelings of disgust persons feel
toward other persons or conduct of which they disapprove.27 She notes that
persons who feel disgust toward those other persons or conduct report
feelings akin to those of the revulsion persons often feel toward bodily waste
and fluids, insects, or other such items from which our hard wiring prompts
us to recoil.28
The connection Professor Nussbaum draws between disgust for certain
items and disgust toward people who are associated with them—the latter of
which she identifies as “animus”29—raises important questions about the
constitutional implications of hoplophobia. Her recognition of humans’
disgust reactions toward certain items30 suggests at least a limited realm in
which disgust toward objects exists, and potentially opens the way to animus,
whether against those objects or persons associated with them.31 This Essay
engages those questions in Part III, after presenting Professor Nussbaum’s
analysis in more detail.
B. Animus Against Gun Owners
Professor Charles next considers the possibility of animus against gun
owners. His discussion of this claim unfolds against a diametrically opposite
conceptual landscape from his discussion of animus against guns
themselves. That earlier discussion raises questions about whether animus
against things even states a coherent proposition. By contrast, his discussion
of animus against gun owners rests on familiar conceptual ground. The
canonical equal protection animus cases struck down government action
because it was based on animus against particular groups: “hippies” and
“hippie communes” in U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,32
intellectually disabled persons in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc.,33 and LGB people in Romer v. Evans and United States v. Windsor.34
27

See NUSSBAUM, DISGUST, supra note 2, at 12–13.
See id. at 15–17.
29 See id. at 141.
30 See infra text accompanying notes 91–93.
31 See infra text accompanying notes 93–96.
32 See 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (noting legislative history hostile to “hippies” and “hippie
communes”).
33 See 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (“The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case appears to
us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the [intellectually disabled] . . . .”).
34 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.”); United
States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013). In addition, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence
v. Texas rested on an equal protection analysis sounding in animus theory. See 539 U.S. 558, 579, 582
(2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). The “T” and “Q” in the common identifier “LGBTQ”
28
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Thus, when Professor Charles considers the possibility of animus against gun
owners, his analysis begins with a strong presumption in favor of its
conceptual plausibility.
That conceptual plausibility in turn raises the empirical question
whether gun owners are likely to be victims of animus. Professor Charles
believes they are not. He identifies
three points that together suggest that we have no good reason to suspect gunowner animus would occur in anything more than anomalous cases: (1) public
safety ends motivate nearly all gun laws, (2) gun laws do not target gun owners
as such, and (3) gun owners as a group have not historically been
marginalized—and even laws burdening this group carry no negative symbolic
effect or stigma.35

Unfortunately, these arguments prove less than Professor Charles might like
them to.
1. Motive and Means–End Analysis
Professor Charles’s first argument—that “public safety ends motivate
nearly all gun laws”36—fails by largely (although not completely) assuming
its conclusion. He writes: “One key reason not to credit the claims of the
gun-rights advocates invoking animus is that gun laws are almost always
motivated by the quintessential public interest.”37 He then explains: “[T]his
does not mean every gun law is constitutional. Yet it does mean that typical
gun laws are not likely to be improperly motivated.”38
By citing gun-regulatory laws’ assertedly legitimate motivations as
evidence of their likely constitutionality, Professor Charles shortcuts the
difficult work of uncovering the illicit motives that lie at the heart of any
animus-based law. To be sure, quite possibly every single gun regulation in
the United States cites public safety justifications. Moreover, legislators who
favor gun regulation likely believe that, indeed, fewer guns mean safer
communities. Professor Charles contrasts those justifications and beliefs
with the corresponding justifications for laws struck down in the equal
protection animus cases. He describes those cases as ones in which “the
Court found itself searching in vain for a justification adequate to support the
government’s action.”39

are omitted because transgender and queer identity were not at issue in Romer, since Amendment 2 itself
focused on sexual orientation and not sexual minority status more generally. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
35 Charles, supra note 1, at 16.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 17.
39 Id.
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The problem is that, in those cases, the government did cite legitimate
justifications for the challenged laws. Of course, and as Professor Charles
observes, the Court found those justifications to be pretextual and identified
animus as the true justification, whether based on courts’ direct fact-finding
about the government’s motivation,40 evidence derived from the legislative
record,41 or as an inference from the lack of any other government interest
supporting the law.42 Nevertheless, those conclusions all required at least a
passing judicial examination of the justifications the government offered,43
and sometimes a relatively fulsome examination.44 But even if brief, the
important point is that in the animus cases the Court undertook that means–
end examination—and sometimes did so in some detail.
It matters that the Court undertook those examinations because an
animus conclusion doesn’t—or at least shouldn’t—spring forth from a quick
and easy observation that a law fails to promote a legitimate government
interest with the requisite rationality. To the contrary: an animus conclusion
should require careful consideration of the government’s proffered
justifications, including careful consideration of the degree of fit between
any legitimate justification and the law’s actual effect.45 To be sure, as I have
discussed in other writing, that means–end analysis does not require a perfect
fit. Unlike, for example, race classifications, government discrimination
attacked as grounded in animus simply requires a fit confirming that the
asserted legitimate government interest is in fact the real one motivating the
government.46 This is not the case with regard to race: for better or for worse,
the Court’s race jurisprudence considers any governmental use of race so
problematic that government must show that its use of race is narrowly

40 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (citing the trial court’s
finding that the ordinance was based in part on “the [City] Council[’s] . . . concern[] with the negative
attitude of the majority of property owners”).
41 See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (noting the legislative history’s
reference to a desire to deny food stamps to “hippies” and “hippie communes”); United States v. Windsor,
570 U.S. 744, 770–71 (2013) (noting the legislative history and the title of the legislation).
42 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996) (reaching its animus conclusion as “an
inevitable inference” from the lack of other plausible justifications for the legislation).
43 See, e.g., Windsor, 570 U.S. at 775 (stating, in the penultimate substantive sentence of the opinion,
that “[t]he federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to
disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and
dignity”).
44 See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448–50 (considering several city council justifications and finding
that the city’s reasons “rest[ed] on an irrational prejudice against the [intellectually disabled]”).
45 See supra note 40 (noting that the Court in Cleburne, one of the Court’s canonical animus cases,
did in fact give the careful consideration identified in the text accompanying this note).
46 See WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW 139–43 (2017).
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tailored to achieve its asserted interest—indeed, an interest that must be
compelling, not merely legitimate.47
The animus inquiry is different. As the goal of that latter inquiry is
simply to ensure that government is motivated by a public-regarding interest,
as opposed to “a bare . . . desire to harm a . . . group,”48 the focus of the
means–end review in animus cases is not to ensure a perfect fit with a
compelling government interest. Rather, all that is required is a reasonable
fit with a legitimate government interest—as long as that interest is the real
one motivating the law.49
Thus, animus claims still require judicial inquiry into the fit between
the challenged action and the government’s interest, even if that inquiry is
differently focused and softer than the analogous inquiry in race50 (or sex51)
cases. Because of this need for fit, Professor Charles cannot simply assert
gun laws’ likely public safety justifications and conclude that those
justifications by themselves rebut an animus claim. Of course, public safety
is a legitimate government interest. Moreover, one might intuitively
conclude that the fewer the guns in a community, the safer that community
is—although gun advocates would dispute that proposition.52 Analogously,
so too might one intuit that persons not fully able to care for themselves
present unique safety concerns in the event of a flood or other emergency
evacuation event.53 One might even intuitively credit a claim that households
comprised of unrelated persons raise more suspicion about public-benefits
fraud.54 Thus, the animus claims in Cleburne and Moreno required the Court

47

See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“We have held that all racial
classifications imposed by government must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. This
means that such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling
governmental interests.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also William N. Eskridge,
Jr., The California Proposition 8 Case: What Is a Constitution For?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1235, 1236 (2010)
(“Strict scrutiny requires that the discrimination be the only way the state can accomplish a compelling
public goal.”).
48 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
49 See ARAIZA, supra note 46, at 141.
50 See supra note 47.
51 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–33 (1996) (employing stringent means–end
review in a sex discrimination case).
52 See, e.g., Robert Leider, The State’s Monopoly of Force and the Right to Bear Arms, 116 NW. U.
L. REV. 35, 56–63 (2021) (citing the underenforcement of law in many communities as a justification for
protecting an individual firearm-possession right).
53 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449 (1985) (citing this
justification offered by the city for its permit denial but rejecting it as poorly fitting the ordinance’s limited
sweep).
54 See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535–37 (1973) (citing this justification offered
by the government for limiting the eligibility of such households under the Food Stamp Act of 1964, but
rejecting it given the limitation’s poor fit with the Act’s existing restrictions and antifraud provisions).
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to interrogate those government justifications—as the Court did, and found
them wanting in both cases.55 As with those cases, simply asserting a public
safety justification may not immunize a gun-regulation law from an animus
challenge.
2. Targeting “Gun Owners as Such”
Professor Charles’s second observation about animus against gun
owners—that “gun laws do not target gun owners as such”56—is similarly
inadequate to refute categorically a claim of anti-gun-owner animus. Contra
Professor Charles’s suggestion, the fact that gun regulations do things such
as “mandate background checks” or “require training and good reason for
carrying guns in public” does not necessarily distinguish them “in form”57
from some of the laws struck down in the canonical animus cases. His
reliance on Professor Akhil Amar’s analysis of the anti-LGB law in Romer
v. Evans as a bill of attainder58 suggests that Professor Charles is making an
argument that when gun laws, for example, “mandate background checks,”
they do not target gun owners’ identities, in a way that the laws did in animus
cases such as Romer.59
Yet this easy distinction based on whether a restriction targets identity
may not be so easy. The difficulty arises from the often blurry relationship
between status and conduct. As the final Part of this Essay argues, that
distinction raises difficult problems concerning when conduct merges into
status or identity, such that bans on gun-related conduct are appropriately
understood as attacks on gun-related identity. Different gun-related conduct
laws may have different relationships to gun owners’ identities.60 For that

55 See supra notes 53–54. Professor Charles describes the animus cases as involving “purported
rationales [that] all appeared pretextual.” Charles, supra note 1, at 17. But as suggested by the Court’s
examination of those rationales in the animus cases, pretext does not appear on its own accord in many
cases; rather, it must be fleshed out by a careful analysis of either subjective government intent or the
plausibility of legitimate justifications, leaving animus as essentially the only justification left standing.
See ARAIZA, supra note 46, at 139–43 (making this point). Indeed, the conclusion of Professor Charles’s
descriptions of these cases concedes the point. See Charles, supra note 1, at 17 (“Poor fit was evidence
of an ulterior motive [in the animus cases].”). The point is that “poor fit” must be identified via a means–
end analysis.
56 Charles, supra note 1, at 16.
57 Id. at 18 (emphasis in third quotation omitted).
58 See id. at 18–19 (discussing Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness,
95 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1996)).
59
Id. at 18.
60 The parallel to Professor Amar’s identity-grounded indictment of Amendment 2 in Romer is clear,
at least conceptually, even if different people may disagree (indeed, disagree heatedly) about whether the
identity category of “gun owner” is truly comparable, for constitutional purposes, to the analogous
category of, say, “LGBTQ+ person” or “disabled person.” See, e.g., Brower, supra note 3, at 87 (“If
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reason, Professor Amar’s critique of Amendment 2 as a legal burden
imposed on a particular status or identity61 may have different degrees of
relevance for different types of gun laws. Bans on owning a weapon might
fall at one extreme end of the spectrum: to the extent a law makes it literally
illegal to own a gun, it similarly outlaws the status of being a gun owner.62
At the other extreme, requirements such as mandatory safety training before
being allowed to own a weapon might be understood as imposing
significantly less of an identity-based burden. A fascinating intermediate
category of restrictions might include restrictions on carrying weapons in
public. Such restrictions might be seen as relatively innocuous burdens on
gun owners’ identities, perhaps akin to time, place, and manner restrictions
in free-speech doctrine.63 Alternatively, they could potentially be
characterized, at least by gun owners themselves, as stripping away their
identity where it matters most—in the public sphere.
Part III considers these nuanced and socially contingent questions once
we have the benefit of Professor Nussbaum’s exploration of the disgust
reactions that she argues form the basis for animus conclusions.64 For now,
the preliminary point is that Professor Charles’s easy dismissal of any claim
that gun-regulatory laws target gun owners qua gun owners may be
premature.

lesbians and gay men have no identity apart from sex, they are indeed similar to . . . drug addicts, smokers,
gun owners, or motorcyclists[,] . . . a collection of miscellaneous individuals united only by a common
activity without any common, collective existence or identity.”).
61 For further information about Professor Amar’s analysis of identity versus conduct regulation, see
Amar, supra note 58, at 225–26.
62 Obviously, Heller and McDonald make it clear that government may not enact a flat-out ban on
gun possession, at least of the types of guns Heller described as “those in common use at the [founding].”
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (internal quotations omitted); see McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). Whether permissible bans on possessing other weapons would
similarly impact the identities of the would-be owners of such guns is a question that implicates an
intricate analysis of the identities of gun owners. For purposes of this Essay, the more important point is
the basic concept of gun ownership’s relationship to a meaningful concept of identity—the identity of
being a gun owner. See supra note 60 (discussing the idea of identity centered on gun ownership).
63 In First Amendment doctrine, content-neutral restrictions on the time, place, or manner by which
speech is made are subject to relatively deferential judicial review. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose reasonable
restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication
of the information.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 797 (observing that an analysis
requiring the government to use the least speech-restrictive means possible “has never been a part of the
inquiry into the validity of a time, place, and manner regulation”).
64 See infra Section III.C (discussing the relationship of restrictions on gun-related conduct to
perceived disapproval of the status of being a gun owner).
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3. Marginalization and Stigmatization
Professor Charles’s final argument about animus against gun owners
maintains that “gun owners as a group have not historically been
marginalized—and even laws burdening this group carry no negative
symbolic effect or stigma.”65 At a doctrinal level, the first of these
observations implicates a problem that has bedeviled equal protection law at
least since the erection of the Court’s suspect class structure in the early
1970s: how can a court reliably determine whether a group has in fact been
marginalized? Supreme Court decisions since the dawn of its experiment
with suspect class analysis have struggled to apply a principled approach to
the political powerlessness question.66 In an example of lower courts echoing
that confusion, two panels of the same circuit court, within just two years of
each other, reached diametrically opposing conclusions about whether LGB
persons lacked political power.67
Viewing Professor Charles’s point more broadly—as one about social
marginalization rather than “simple” political powerlessness—makes the
analysis even more challenging. Determining whether gun owners are
socially marginalized turns on judgments about social reality that are highly
contested, factually contingent, and quite arguably beyond courts’
competence.68 As with his other arguments about animus against gun owners,
his conclusions about the lack of marginalization gun owners experience
would benefit from more nuanced discussion of types of contested
marginalization and their applicability to gun owners.
The second half of Professor Charles’s assertion, that gun laws inflict
no “negative symbolic effect or stigma,” raises the even more difficult
question of identifying stigmatic harm. Again speaking at a doctrinal level,
scholars have similarly noted the difficulty courts have encountered in the
Establishment Clause context when asking whether a law endorses a
65

Charles, supra note 1, at 16.
Compare, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686–88 (1973) (plurality opinion)
(explaining that the enactment of legislation benefiting women and outlawing sex discrimination, rather
than reflecting women’s political power, illustrated the existence of a problem Congress was justified in
addressing), with United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575–76 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the enactment of that legislation illustrates that sex discrimination should be demoted
from evaluation under strict scrutiny to rational basis review because such legislation indicates that
women can successfully wield political power).
67 Compare High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Off., 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990)
(finding that LGB persons have political power), with Watkins v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1447–48
(9th Cir. 1988) (finding they do not).
68 See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527, 1571 &
n.252 (2015) (noting the difficulty courts encounter when they try to determine whether a particular group
is politically powerless and quoting cases suggesting judges’ inability to make such determinations); id.
at 1571 n.253 (quoting scholars expressing that same view about judges’ capabilities).
66
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particular religion or makes nonbelievers feel excluded from full
membership in the political community.69 While the analogy is not precise,
any judicial inquiry into stigmatic harm requires similarly nuanced and
socially contingent analysis. At the very least, though, Professor Charles’s
assertion about the stigma-free implications of gun laws, just like his prior
assertion about the public safety justifications for gun laws, comes
troublingly close to assuming a conclusion.
C. Animus Against Rights
Professor Charles’s third claim addresses whether it makes conceptual
sense to think about animus against rights and, if it does, whether such
antirights animus infects gun regulations. Professor Charles begins his
discussion by recognizing the potentially poor fit between the animus idea
and conduct, that is, the exercise of rights.70 However, he acknowledges that
the Court has implicitly endorsed the conceptual possibility that animus
might exist against conduct by applying something closely akin to animus
principles in a series of religious freedom cases.71 Nevertheless, he concludes
that it makes little sense to embrace the idea of animus against gun rights.
Professor Charles first indicates that laws regulating gun-related conduct do
not “express vile views” or implicate rights, such as equality, “that can be
infringed through symbolism or expressive government action”72—
situations in which, he contends, a focus on intent (and thus animus) may
make the most sense.73 Second, he argues that “consequentialist concerns”74
justify ignoring intent in Second Amendment cases, since he believes that
Second Amendment rights can be effectively protected by means–end
inquiries that focus on a challenged law’s effects, rather than its motives.75
69 See, e.g., Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Government Brand, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1195, 1214–16
(2016) (explaining the difficulty courts experience in applying the endorsement test through the lens of a
reasonable observer); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion
relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political community. Government can run afoul of that
prohibition in two principal ways. One is excessive entanglement with religious institutions . . . . The
second and more direct infringement is government endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement
sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community.”). In later cases, Justice O’Connor explained that the endorsement test should be applied by
examining the perceptions of a reasonable observer. See, e.g., Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 778–79 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
70
See Charles, supra note 1, at 21.
71 See id.
72 Id. at 23.
73 See id.
74 Id. at 24.
75 See id.
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Professor Charles persuasively argues that the nature of some rights is
such that inquiries into bad intent (such as animus) play no useful role.
Sometimes, government disfavor and social disdain toward the exercise of a
right may be acceptable so long as government nevertheless protects that
exercise.76 For example, we may dislike particular speech (indeed, we may
“hate” it)77 as long as we protect it. The same might be true of arming oneself
despite community objections that such conduct makes it less safe, or of
having an abortion despite moral objections a community might have to that
practice. Despite such conduct’s protected status, such majoritarian dislike
may well be constitutionally acceptable, as long as regulations do not
effectively infringe on the performance of the conduct.78 He contrasts such
rights to those whose unconstitutional effect flows, at least in part, from the
message a challenged law sends. Thus, he argues that, for example, laws that
allegedly constitute an establishment of religion or express racial inferiority
are proper subjects for an intent, and thus ultimately an animus, inquiry.79
The problem resides in determining whether the Second Amendment
right is akin to those rights for which intent inquiries play no proper role.
Professor Charles considers gun rights to fall within the category of rights
“that do not implicate expressive interests or for which a direct assessment
of burdens and consequences is easier than a search for governmental
motive.”80 However, as suggested by this Essay’s analysis of Professor
Charles’s argument about animus against gun owners,81 it is at least plausible
to suggest that some gun regulation does indeed implicate government
motivations in ways that render a motive inquiry viable, even if not
necessarily the preferred way of analyzing such laws. The unfortunate fact
of the matter is that the gun issue in the United States has transcended
Indeed, in a footnote he states his “sympath[y]” with a position I took during a conversation with
him, that it is perfectly legitimate for government to disfavor, dislike, or (if one wishes to use the critical
term) harbor animus toward particular conduct, even when that conduct is otherwise constitutionally
protected. See id. at 21 n.123; E-mail from William D. Araiza to Jacob Charles (May 24, 2021) (on file
with author).
77 See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (calling for
“freedom for the thought that we hate”). While Justice Holmes spoke of “thought,” modern judges and
justices have acknowledged that such protection extends to “speech that we hate.” E.g., Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1737 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[W]e protect
speech that we hate . . . .”).
78 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850, 869 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (“Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”).
79 See Charles, supra note 1, at 23.
80 Id. at 24–25 (“[N]othing in the text, history, tradition, or doctrine of the Second Amendment
suggests that the right safeguards any expressive interests.”); see also infra note 87 and accompanying
text (identifying a potential tension in Professor Charles’s discussion of the expressive nature of gun
possession but offering a possible explanation).
81 See supra Section II.B.
76
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substantive debate about the merits or drawbacks of a given law and has
become, in part, a fight about identity. While both sides may dress up their
arguments in the neutral language of policy analysis, the stakes, as Professor
Charles notes, may transcend policy concerns to implicate gun owners’
identities.82 In particular, attacks on gun rights often appear to gun owners to
be attacks on the culture of gun owners, and thus attacks on the owners
themselves.83 Thus, alleged animus against Second Amendment rightholders potentially merges into alleged animus against the right itself.
This relationship between alleged animus against gun rights and gun
owners finds an analogue in animus doctrine’s migration into religious
freedom cases. As Professor Charles notes and as I have previously written,
the Court’s equal protection animus jurisprudence has traveled a circuitous
path, with the Court borrowing the animus concept for use in Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause cases, modifying it to meet the needs of those
particular doctrinal areas, and then replanting it into equal protection soil.84
Indeed, Professor Charles’s rejection of animus against Second Amendment
rights identifies the religion context as an example of a situation where it
does make sense to speak of animus against rights.85
Comparing these two contexts reveals the insufficiency of any easy
conclusion that animus-against-rights claims have no place in Second
Amendment doctrine. A foundational characteristic of religion, religious
beliefs, and religious practice is that they often help constitute persons’
identities.86 As Professor Charles concedes, gun owners may construct their

82

See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
The cultural tie-in to the gun-regulation question was illustrated by the controversy that erupted
during the 2008 presidential primary campaign when then-candidate Barack Obama stated that people in
economically struggling communities “cling to guns” to express their “bitter” feelings and was in turn
criticized for allegedly being out of touch with working-class voters. See Jeff Zeleny, Opponents Call
Obama Remarks “Out of Touch,” N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/12/
us/politics/12campaign.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer
[https://perma.cc/8J5T-F5MZ]; cf. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 413, 461 (1999) (“[T]he reason that members of the anti-[gun-]control minority care so intensely
[about the gun issue] is that they know the aim of gun legislation is to disparage their cultural identities.
Gun registration might be no more onerous than auto registration, but the social meaning of the former
makes it impossible for gun owners to bear . . . .”).
84 See Charles, supra note 1, at 6; Araiza, supra note 13, at 1009.
85 See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
86 See, e.g., Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 NW. U. L.
REV. 1113, 1164-65 (1988) (“Religious beliefs, by their very nature, form a central part of a person’s
belief structure, his inner self. They define a person’s very being—his sense of who he is, why he exists,
and how he should relate to the world around him. A person’s religious beliefs cannot meaningfully be
separated from the person himself; they are who he is.”). For a discussion of how religion can constitute
a core feature of a person’s identity, see Avigail Eisenberg, Religion as Identity, 10 LAW & ETHICS HUM.
RTS. 295, 300 (2016).
83
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identities around their gun ownership.87 If so, then, just as it is possible to
think about animus against particular religious practices88 (since those
practices help define members of the religious sect that performs them), so
too it is possible to think about animus against gun possession (since such
conduct may well define many gun owners). That equation of gun and
religious rights is at least plausible (if concededly not self-evidently correct),
because in both cases, the conduct (engaging in particular religious exercises
or possessing a gun) is sufficiently central to the actor’s identity that animus
against that conduct potentially shades into animus against members of the
group that performs it.89
*

*

*

This Part’s examination of Professor Charles’s analysis reveals that
beneath the surface plausibility of his rejection of the animus concept in
Second Amendment cases, there may lie deeper social meanings in guns
themselves, gun owners’ identities, and the exercise of gun rights, and a
deeper connection between those meanings. Those meanings and the
connections between them may justify labeling at least some gun regulations
as grounded in animus—or they may not. To resolve this question, it is
necessary to consider the conceptual foundation of the animus prohibition.
III. FROM DISGUST TO ANIMUS
This final Part considers that foundation. It relies heavily on legal
philosopher Martha Nussbaum’s work on the concept of disgust and how
that concept relates to legal and social oppression of particular groups.90
87 See Charles, supra note 1, at 18. But see id. at 24 (“[N]othing in the text, history, tradition, or
doctrine of the Second Amendment suggests that the right safeguards any expressive interests.”). The
seeming tension between these two propositions is resolvable when one realizes that they address
different ideas: respectively, gun owners’ perceptions of the expressive component of their gun
possession conduct and the focus of the Second Amendment right itself.
88 See, e.g., James Oleske, Jr., Lukumi at Twenty: A Legacy of Uncertainty for Religious Liberty and
Animal Welfare Laws, 19 ANIMAL L. 295, 330 (2013) (stating that in City of Boerne v. Flores, “the Court
identified the baseline for what constitutes a free exercise violation as ‘legislation enacted or enforced
due to animus or hostility to the burdened religious practices’” (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 531 (1997))).
89 Professor Charles argues that either all or most gun laws do not target gun owners’ identities
because they do not target gun owners “as such.” See Charles, supra note 1, at 18. I address this argument
supra Section II.B.2.
90 See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, DISGUST, supra note 2, at 169–70 (“Because gay male behavior in particular
has been hypersexualized in the public imaginary[,] . . . it is easy to connect gay men to disease and
defilement by focusing on venues . . . where casual sexual interactions take place, and then to stigmatize
the entire community by associating it with a scare-image of these places as sites of disease.”); id. at 17
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Professor Nussbaum argues that the Supreme Court’s animus jurisprudence
rests on the principle that laws cannot legitimately rely on a view that certain
groups are “disgusting” (as she uses the term).91 As she explains, such disgust
reactions reflect an understanding of the targeted group as subhuman—
indeed, as associated with what she calls the “primary objects” of disgust,
namely, “feces, blood, semen, urine, nasal discharges, menstrual discharges,
corpses, decaying meat, and animals/insects that are oozy, slimy, or
smelly.”92 From the association of particular groups of persons with those
objects, it is only a short step to conclude that laws motivated by such views
rest on an illegitimate motive—that is, animus.93
Professor Nussbaum applies these insights to discrimination,
particularly, although not exclusively, against LGB persons and, more
precisely, against gay men.94 Her argument is straightforward, but powerful:
when majorities react to such groups in ways akin to their instinctive
reactions to disgust’s primary objects, they seek to stigmatize, suppress, and
exclude them in order to maintain distance from the impurities with which
those individuals are associated.95 Political opposition to such groups, she
notes, often emphasizes their association with those impurities: for example,
she observes that proponents of Colorado’s Amendment 2 (struck down in
Romer) distributed circulars claiming that gay men eat blood and feces.96 She
suggests that gay men are particularly likely to trigger such disgust reactions,
(“Societies have many ways of stigmatizing vulnerable minorities. Disgust is not the only mechanism of
stigmatization. It is, however, a powerful and central one . . . .”).
91 See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, HIDING, supra note 2, at 150–51 (concluding that, at base, the argument
made by the proponents of Amendment 2 and rejected by the Court’s animus analysis in Romer rested
solely on disgust).
92 NUSSBAUM, DISGUST, supra note 2, at 15–16.
93 See id. at 110–13 (discussing Romer and noting its foundation in Cleburne and Moreno).
94 NUSSBAUM, HIDING, supra note 2, at 113 (referring to “the central locus of disgust in today’s
United States: male loathing of the male homosexual”); see also id. at 92–93 (discussing disgust toward
disabled persons).
95 See NUSSBAUM, DISGUST, supra note 2, at 13 (“People do feel deep disgust with certain practices
and, by extension, the groups that engage in those practices. They believe that these practices threaten the
social fabric, and they are usually eager to make law in response to that perceived threat.”); id. at 16 (“All
societies, it appears, identify at least some humans as disgusting. Very likely this is a stratagem adopted
to cordon off the dominant group more securely from its own feared animality: if those quasi humans
stand between me and the world of disgusting animality, then I am that much further from being
mortal/decaying/smelly/oozy myself.”).
96 NUSSBAUM, HIDING, supra note 2, at 101; see also JOHN W. DOWER, WAYS OF FORGETTING,
WAYS OF REMEMBERING: JAPAN IN THE MODERN WORLD 30 (2012) (quoting the war correspondent
Ernie Pyle’s reporting of how Japanese persons were “looked upon” by personnel in the Allied Pacific
Theater “as something subhuman and repulsive, the way some people feel about cockroaches or mice,”
and reporting, upon seeing Japanese prisoners as “wrestling and laughing and talking just like normal
human beings,” that nevertheless “they gave me the creeps, and I wanted a mental bath after looking at
them”).
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given the features of their sexual practices, in particular, their willingness to
be penetrated with the very bodily fluids (especially semen) that are
considered disgusting.97
Professor Nussbaum’s provocative analysis raises the question whether
reactions to guns, gun owners, or gun rights can be analogized to the disgust
reactions Professor Nussbaum concludes underlay the laws struck down in
the canonical animus cases. The three Sections that follow reconsider each
of those possibilities, now in the light of insights Professor Nussbaum’s
analysis makes possible.
A. Disgust Toward Guns
Begin with the possibility that reactions to guns can be analogized to
the primary-object disgust reactions Professor Nussbaum identifies as the
cornerstone of animus. Her focus on such reactions seemingly undermines
the coherence of any argument that negative public reactions to guns
themselves constitute animus against those objects. Persons may dislike guns
or even fear them, even to the point of not wishing to touch them. But even
such reactions to danger are a far cry from the disgust Professor Nussbaum
links to those primary objects98 and their association with the targets of
animus.99
It may seem that Professor Nussbaum’s identification of primary
objects that trigger such intense and innate disgust reactions raises doubts
about hoplophobia’s relationship to those reactions. As noted above, even
strongly negative reactions to guns simply do not reflect the innate aversion
Professor Nussbaum discusses. Moreover, she characterizes disgust
reactions as cross-cultural, “standardly felt” “[i]n virtually all societies.”100
By contrast, hoplophobia is surely culture-specific: a warrior culture or
subculture, or a subculture that experiences guns as benign objects (for
example, as items used in a reenactment of a Revolutionary War military

97 NUSSBAUM, DISGUST, supra note 2, at 18–19; Richard E. Redding, It’s Really About Sex: SameSex Marriage, Lesbigay Parenting, and the Psychology of Disgust, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 127,
187 (2008) (noting the particularly visceral negative public reaction to gay male sex).
98 See NUSSBAUM, HIDING, supra note 2, at 88 (distinguishing danger reactions from disgust
reactions).
99 See supra note 96 and accompanying text; cf. NUSSBAUM, DISGUST, supra note 2, at 16 (discussing
disgust projected on “untouchables in the Indian caste system” for an association with their
responsibilities for cleaning latrines and disposing of corpses as well as on women for “their role in birth[]
and menstruation”).
100 NUSSBAUM, DISGUST, supra note 2, at 15.
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parade or as part of a family hunting outing), would likely not experience
disgust reactions when presented with a gun.101
To be sure, some Americans’ culturally specific negative reactions to
guns likely reflect a connection between them and something beyond the
items themselves. Indeed, they must, lest those reactions be purely arbitrary.
It may be that guns—not disgust triggering in themselves—might
nevertheless be connected with either activities or persons that trigger deeper
levels of disgust than would be naturally attributable to guns themselves.102
This possibility is considered later, when this Essay considers disgust toward
gun possession (conduct) and gun owners (persons who engage in that
conduct).
This analysis suggests that any disgust toward guns arises at most
indirectly, from reactions toward gun-related conduct or persons engaging in
that conduct, either of which might trigger disgust toward guns themselves.
Such a dynamic is one step further removed from the disgust reactions
Professor Nussbaum identifies when discussing targets of animus such as
gay men. The disgust reaction to gay men directly connects them to the
primary objects of disgust—gay men are themselves associated with bodily
fluids, oozy insects, and the like.103 By contrast, the disgust toward guns
under consideration here connects guns with either persons or conduct that
others in turn associate with those primary objects.
Such disgust reactions toward guns can be powerful, even if indirect.
For example, Professor Nussbaum describes the more direct association of
primary disgust objects with animus targets as “extend[ing] from object to
object in ways that could hardly bear rational scrutiny.”104 But she could just
as well be describing cases in which municipalities have sought to exclude
facilities such as firing ranges for reasons that collapsed under any
meaningful scrutiny.105 Nevertheless, more important than the intensity of
101 For one example of a cross-cultural study about attitudes toward guns, see Claire Ann Cook,
Young People’s Attitudes Towards Guns in America, Great Britain, and Western Australia,
30 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 93, 100–03 (2004) (finding both differences and similarities in such attitudes
among young people in three English-speaking nations).
102 Such reactions may also flow from other impulses—for example, the association of guns with
danger. See NUSSBAUM, HIDING, supra note 2, at 88 (distinguishing this impulse from disgust).
103 See NUSSBAUM, DISGUST, supra note 2, at 18–19 (“The idea of semen and feces mixing together
inside the body of a male is one of the most disgusting ideas imaginable—to males, for whom the idea of
nonpenetrability is a sacred boundary against stickiness, ooze, and death. . . . Thus disgust is ultimately
disgust at one’s own imagined penetrability and ooziness, and this is why the male homosexual is . . .
regarded with disgust . . . .”).
104 Id. at 15.
105 See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 709 (7th Cir. 2011) (“In the district court, the
City presented no data or expert opinion to support the range ban, so we have no way to evaluate the
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such indirect disgust is the fact that it is indeed indirect, flowing from an
association with something else, rather than flowing directly from the
primary-object disgust reactions she considers virtually instinctive to
humans.
Still, even this more indirect relationship raises interesting questions
about alleged hoplophobia. The question here would be whether any such
indirectly derived disgust can reasonably be analogized to the disgust
Professor Nussbaum discusses. If so, such reactions would derive from
disgust toward either gun owners or gun-related conduct. This Essay now
turns to those latter possible objects of disgust.
B. Disgust Toward Gun Owners
Does it make sense to think about gun laws as reflecting disgust toward
gun owners, and thus, ultimately, animus toward them? Recall from the
previous Section’s discussion of hoplophobia that the relevant type of disgust
involves an identification of a group with the primary objects of disgust—
the bodily wastes, decaying flesh, and insect-like items that trigger innate
feelings of revulsion. As noted earlier, Professor Nussbaum argues that the
victims of at least some of the laws struck down in canonical animus cases
have been or can be associated with such objects. Anti-gay activists have
explicitly associated gay men with those objects.106 Professor Nussbaum also
notes the existence of similar revulsion to the very sight of some disabled
people—perhaps, she suggests, because such people are visual reminders of
human decay.107 Indeed, the background facts of the canonical animus case
involving disabled persons, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc.,108 feature neighbors’ reactions to the proposed group home for
intellectually disabled persons that take on the characteristics of disgust
reactions.109 Some of those reactions, to the extent they emphasized fear of

seriousness of its claimed public-safety concerns. Indeed, on this record those concerns are entirely
speculative and, in any event, can be addressed through sensible zoning and other appropriately tailored
regulations.”).
106 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
107 See NUSSBAUM, HIDING, supra note 2, at 92–93.
108 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
109 See,
e.g., Scott McCartney, Quiet Neighborhood Becomes Court Battleground,
HENDERSONVILLE TIMES-NEWS, Nov. 22, 1984, at 32 (“The older women are fearful of this thing. There
are a lot of older women in this neighborhood and they don’t want these people around.” (quoting a
resident)); Richard Carelli, Texas Town Divided over Proposed Group Home, BOWLING GREEN DAILY
NEWS, May 5, 1985, at 23-B (“I’m a coward. It’s not a very pleasant thought to go to bed and know
there’s 13 demented, self-afflicted people across the street from you.” (quoting a witness at the zoning
hearing)); see also ARAIZA, supra note 46, at 37–39 (providing additional factual background to the city’s
deliberations and decision).
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spatial proximity, reflect scholars’ theories of how disgust reactions manifest
more generally in the case of disabled persons.110
More speculatively, we can widen our gaze and identify groups that
experience such disgust reactions in other legal contexts analogous to
animus. Most notably, in the free religious exercise context, dislike of
minority religions can easily be understood to trigger reactions that, in the
equal protection context, one would characterize as animus based. For
example, in a 1993 free exercise case that began the borrowing of animusstyle reasoning into free exercise jurisprudence, the Court focused heavily
on the subjective hostility community members felt toward a minority
religious group that performed animal sacrifices.111 The fact that the religious
group in question apparently garnered enmity because of its animal-sacrifice
rituals112 suggests that, indeed, the animus the Court perceived arose from a
disgust-related association between the group and the blood that
characterized its practices and thus defined the group itself.113
Thus, disgust appears to be a prime instinct prompting government
actions the Court has condemned as animus or (in religion cases) something
closely analogous.114 This observation allows us to examine the public’s
reaction to gun owners to determine if those reactions reflect that same sort
of disgust. With the question so framed, Professor Charles’s analysis of
animus toward gun owners quite appropriately considers whether gun

110 See, e.g., Karen Soldatic & Barbara Pini, The Three Ds of Welfare Reform: Disability, Disgust
and Deservingness, 15 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 77, 82 (2009) (“Disgust symbolises disability exclusion,
w[h]ere bodies are spatialised to minimise biological, moral, cultural and social contamination. In a desire
to minimise moral contagion, disability is separated, excluded and then bounded outside the public
sphere.”). Professor Nussbaum expresses ambivalence about the nature of persons’ disgust reactions
toward disabled persons. See NUSSBAUM, HIDING, supra note 2, at 92–93 (stating that “[t]o a great extent,
[disgust toward disabled persons] is socially constructed”); id. at 93 (speculating that “there is some
primary disgust attaching to the sight” of a disabled person).
111 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540–42 (1993) (opinion
of Kennedy, J.). This part of the otherwise-majority opinion spoke only for Justices Kennedy and Stevens.
However, later religious freedom cases featured Court majorities incorporating animus-style reasoning.
See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct 1719, 1731 (2018); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.
Ct. 2392, 2420–21 (2018). See generally Araiza, supra note 13, at 993–97 (discussing how the Court
discerned whether animus existed in both Free Exercise Clause cases such as Lukumi and Masterpiece
and Establishment Clause cases such as Hawaii).
112 See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 548–56 (reprinting the ordinances and including, within the ordinances’
recitals, grounds for the residents’ concern about religious groups conducting animal sacrifices).
113 The idea of blood as an object of disgust is well accepted by theorists of disgust. See, e.g.,
NUSSBAUM, DISGUST, supra note 2, at 15; see also Thomas Kazen, The Role of Disgust in Priestly Purity
Law, 3 J.L. RELIGION & ST. 62, 72 (2014) (suggesting the relationship between disgust and the various
impurities identified in ancient biblical texts, including menstrual blood).
114 See, e.g., Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 541 (describing the reaction to the targeted group’s practices as
“evidenc[ing] significant hostility exhibited by residents, members of the city council, and other city
officials toward the Santeria religion and its practice of animal sacrifice”).
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owners, like LGB or disabled persons, have experienced stigmatization.115
Professor Charles’s specification of stigmatization as an indicator of animus
reflects, at a more general level, Professor Nussbaum’s identification of
disgust as the critical phenomenon in animus cases. Stigmatization literally
signifies an indelible marking of something, usually in order to brand it as
undesirable.116 More generally, stigma has been defined as “a mark of
disgrace associated with a particular circumstance, quality, or person.”117 So
understood, Professor Charles’s idea that animus reflects stigma jibes nicely
with Professor Nussbaum’s explanation that primary objects of disgust still
trigger disgust even when those objects’ disgusting qualities are cordoned
off from persons who otherwise encounter those items.118
Professor Charles appears on firm ground in distinguishing any
negative feelings persons may feel toward gun owners from the
stigmatization that equates LGB and disabled persons with primary objects
of disgust. Some people with homophobic or ableist attitudes may see in
LGB or disabled persons the qualities that would otherwise disgust them:
indelible connections with bodily discharges, impurity, decay, or death.119
But not even the most rabid anti-gun activist likely thinks of gun owners in
such terms. At most, disgust reactions to gun owners reflect a socially
constructed disgust deriving from opposition to their gun-related conduct
and, by extension, to what Professor Dan Kahan calls “the moral
commitments associated with [gun owners’] cultural style.”120 While that
opposition may be a powerful feeling—one sufficient to engender vociferous
opposition to such conduct—it appears qualitatively different from the more

115 Charles, supra note 1, at 20. The text sentence limits itself to LGB persons, to reflect its focus on
Romer and the other sexual orientation animus cases. However, disgust-based stigmatization of
transgender persons is a real phenomenon, as measured by scholars. See, e.g., Logan Samuel Casey, The
Politics of Disgust: Public Opinion Toward LGBTQ People & Policies 44 (2016) (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Michigan) (on file with the University of Michigan Library) (discussing the relevance of
disgust for transgender communities).
116 See Martha Nussbaum, Inscribing the Face: Shame, Stigma, and Punishment, in POLITICAL
EXCLUSION AND DOMINATION: NOMOS XLVI 259, 275 (Stephen Macedo & Melissa S. Williams eds.,
2005) (“Many occasions for social shame are straightforwardly physical . . . . Some are features of the
person’s form of life: sexual minorities, criminals, and the unemployed are major recipients of stigma.
These latter types of deviation from the normal are not branded on the face. Societies have, in
consequence, found it convenient to inflict a visible mark. The word ‘stigma’ is in fact the name for this
mark.”).
117 Stigma, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHRASE AND FABLE (2d ed. 2005), https://www.
oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20111007171501221 [https://perma.cc/CD3Z-E7QD].
118 See NUSSBAUM, HIDING, supra note 2, at 88 (describing experiments demonstrating this effect).
119 See Yoel Inbar, David A. Pizarro, Joshua Knobe & Paul Bloom, Disgust Sensitivity Predicts
Intuitive Disapproval of Gays, 9 EMOTION 435, 436, 438 (2009).
120 Kahan, supra note 83, at 460.
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visceral reactions Professor Nussbaum and others associate with opposition
to LGB and disabled persons.
Or maybe not.
C. Disgust Toward Gun Possession
Can the insights of Professor Nussbaum and others121 about disgust
toward persons nevertheless apply to gun owners via a disgust reaction
toward conduct, in this case gun possession or display? As this Essay
discussed in its preliminary evaluation of Professor Charles’s examination
of animus toward gun rights, the plausibility of any claim of animus toward
gun possession turns largely on the connection between such conduct and
gun owners’ identity.122 That preliminary evaluation suggested that gunrelated conduct can in fact be expressive of identity.123 Do Professor
Nussbaum’s and others’ insights about disgust provide further grounds to
interrogate the possibility of disgust, and thus animus, toward such identityforming conduct?
They might. It may be that the exercise of gun rights can be said to elicit
a disgust reaction exactly because that exercise becomes associated with a
class of persons (gun owners), who then become the actual objects of that
reaction. To investigate this, consider first what such disgust reactions might
look like. Professor Nussbaum’s discussion of same-sex sexual conduct
provides the most graphic illustration of such reactions. She cites the
reluctance of the judge in Oscar Wilde’s famous sodomy trial even to
describe his peers’ likely reactions to the conduct of which Wilde had been
convicted.124 The depth of Victorian society’s disgust toward sodomy reflects
Blackstone’s description of it (a description with which the judge in the
Wilde case very likely would have been familiar): a crime “the very mention
of which is a disgrace to human nature” and thus “not fit to be named.”125
Bringing such disgust reactions into the contemporary world, Chief Justice

121 See, e.g., Soldatic & Pini, supra note 110, at 78 (discussing concepts of disgust in relation to
disability discrimination).
122 See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text.
123 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
124 See NUSSBAUM, HIDING, supra note 2, at 72 (“The judge . . . said that he would prefer not to
describe ‘the sentiments which must rise to the breast of every man of honour who has heard the details
of these two terrible trials,’ but his virulent condemnation of the defendants made his disgust amply
evident.” (quoting MONTGOMERY H. HYDE, THE THREE TRIALS OF OSCAR WILDE 339 (1956))); id. at
104 (“In . . . the Wilde case, the moralism [of the presiding judge] seems to be a cloak for a quite familiar
type of disgust, expressing contamination from the presence of an allegedly vile creature . . . .”).
125 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215.
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Burger’s concurring opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick quoted that passage
from Blackstone.126
Such visceral reactions appear to have no connection to the reactions
even vehement anti-gun advocates have toward the exercise of gun rights.
But that doesn’t mean animus cannot creep in. Rather, it is possible that
vociferous opposition to gun-related conduct can combine with the identitycreating force of such conduct to generate an instinctive dislike of persons
whose identity is tied up with the disfavored conduct that creates that
identity.
Consider the steps in such an analysis. First, opposition to gun-related
conduct runs deep among some American communities (just like, on the
other side, opposition to gun regulations runs deep in other communities).127
Second, as Professor Charles observes, it is probably fair to say that many
gun owners view gun possession in ways constituting their identity.128 Of
course, it may be overly simplistic to embrace the simple syllogism that
follows from these steps: “(1) feelings about gun-related conduct run deep;
(2) gun-related conduct helps constitute many gun owners’ identities;
(3) therefore, feelings about gun owners’ identities run deep.” Nevertheless,
the tight connection between conduct and identity makes it plausible to
conceive of visceral opposition to gun-related conduct as spilling over into a
dislike of those whose very identity is bound up in that conduct.
We have been down this road before. During the seventeen years
between Bowers’s upholding of sodomy prohibitions and Lawrence v.
Texas’s overruling of Bowers,129 gay rights litigators struggled mightily, with
only partial success, to disentangle LGB status and same-sex sexual
conduct.130 As Professor Nussbaum explains, the disgust some persons feel
toward that conduct easily slides into a feeling of aversion for those who
126 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003).
127 See, e.g., ERIC MCGHEE, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., CALIFORNIA’S POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 2020
(2020), https://www.ppic.org/publication/californias-political-geography/ [https://perma.cc/DT9GJZFP] (describing an “extremely sharp geographic divide” among different parts of California with regard
to gun control); Katherine Schaeffer, Key Facts About Americans and Guns, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 13,
2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/09/13/key-facts-about-americans-and-guns/ [https://
perma.cc/7MJ3-24TW] (showing geographic splits in Americans’ views about guns more generally).
128 See Charles, supra note 1, at 18; see also KIM PARKER, JULIANA HOROWITZ, RUTH IGIELNIK,
BAXTER OLIPHANT & ANNA BROWN, PEW RSCH. CTR., AMERICA’S COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP WITH GUNS
31 (2017) (noting that 50% of gun owners believe that owning a gun is either very important or somewhat
important to their identity).
129 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
130 See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 98, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding government
employment sexual orientation discrimination against an equal protection challenge largely on the
strength of Bowers’s upholding of laws criminalizing sodomy); id. at 103 (“[T]here can hardly be more
palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class criminal.”).
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perform it and indeed whose proclivity to perform it is understood to define
them.
An understanding that conduct often shades into identity renders more
comprehensible some of the more extreme examples of the regulation of
gun-related conduct, such as municipal prohibitions on firing ranges and gun
stores Professor Charles identifies.131 Such exclusionary actions have at least
a facial similarity to the physical exclusion the Cleburne City Council
mandated through its refusal to allow intellectually disabled persons to
establish a group home in a residential neighborhood. More conceptually,
they also resemble Amendment 2, struck down in Romer, especially when
one considers Justice Kennedy’s evocative conclusion that Amendment 2
made LGB persons “stranger[s] to its law[].”132 Even though the gun
restrictions mentioned above deal with regulations of conduct, they feature
exclusionary elements common to regulations that were understood in
Cleburne and Romer as condemnations of status, and condemned by the
Court for that reason.
Indeed, even deeper parallels emerge between the gun-related conduct
laws Professor Charles mentions and the status regulations in Cleburne and
Romer. As Professor Charles notes, the city in the firing-range case could
offer no plausible reason for excluding those facilities. Indeed, by insisting
that any person wishing to exercise her Second Amendment right receive
gun training, and then without any reasonable justification making it
impossible to obtain that training within the city limits, the city was exposed
as simply wishing to banish the exercise of gun rights within that city.133 So
understood, one can analogize such cases to animus cases such as Romer and
Cleburne, in which the Court examined the government’s ostensibly
reasonable justifications for the challenged laws and found them wanting,134
thus leaving banishment—metaphorical or physical—as the only
justification.
Even more importantly to the relationship between status and conduct,
the banishment condemned in Romer and Cleburne took the form of
exclusions that targeted the exercise of rights. Amendment 2 did not attempt
to expel LGB Coloradans from the state (as, of course, Colorado could not
See Charles, supra note 1, at 28–29 (discussing a city’s requirement that a person wishing to own
a gun obtain firing-range training, paired with a prohibition on firing ranges within the city); id. at 13–14
(discussing a city’s attempt to ban the location of a high-end gun store within the city).
132 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
133 See Charles, supra note 1, at 29; see also Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 691, 709–10
(7th Cir. 2011) (acknowledging the comprehensive firing-range ban as disproportional to the public
interests claimed).
134 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634–35; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
448 (1985).
131

1390

116:1365 (2022)

Disgust and Guns

do): instead, it “merely” prevented the assertion of nondiscrimination claims
based on those persons’ defining characteristic.135 The Cleburne City
Council’s zoning decision did effectively exclude the intellectually disabled,
at least from a particular neighborhood.136 However, as Justice Marshall’s
separate opinion in Cleburne pointed out, the city’s decision also burdened
the exercise of a right, as it prevented that group from establishing a home
in their desired location.137
Thus, in Romer and Cleburne the challenged laws could be understood
as burdening the exercises of rights as manifestations of dislike of the groups
that would exercise those rights, and doing so in ways that suggest,
respectively, social and physical exclusion or distancing. So too, one can
understand the firing-range and retail prohibitions Professor Charles
discusses138 as reflecting a similar desire to accomplish such distancing, via
laws that similarly burdened the exercise of rights. Concededly, the analogy
is not complete, even leaving aside obvious—indeed, compelling—
objections that gun owners and gun rights are simply different from,
respectively, LGB and disabled persons and the rights they were prevented
from exercising.139 Unlike with the groups targeted in Romer and Cleburne,
a community’s physical distancing of itself from guns—and thus from gun
possession—can more readily be defended in terms of legitimate interests in
public safety. In other words, physically distancing a community from the
exercise of Second Amendment rights could plausibly be defended as a
reasonable police power measure.140
Despite that difference, given that individual gun possession is now
established as a constitutional right, it is hard to see community opposition
to a firing range, when combined with a requirement of firing-range training
as a condition of owning a gun, as reflecting anything other than hostility to
the exercise of Second Amendment rights. More to the current point, such
hostility to the exercise of those rights arguably shades over into hostility to
the group with whom such exercise is linked so closely as to become part of

135

See Romer, 517 U.S. at 624 (quoting Amendment 2).
See 473 U.S. at 435–37 (explaining the actions of the organization that sought to establish a group
home for intellectually disabled persons).
137 See id. at 455, 461 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
138 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
139 See Brower, supra note 3, at 87 (suggesting this fundamental difference).
140 As a general matter, police power regulations are reviewed deferentially by courts, to the extent
they do not trench on constitutionally protected rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See,
e.g., Lynn Marmer, The New Breed of Municipal Dog Control Laws: Are They Constitutional?, 53 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1067, 1070–72 (1984) (“As a general rule, exercises of the police power by a state or city
are presumed to be constitutionally valid.”).
136
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that group’s perceived identity. In other words, hostility to the conduct
becomes hostility to the group with which that conduct is identified.
But is that hostility based on primary-object disgust of the sort Professor
Nussbaum examines? Ultimately, that answer appears to be no. To be sure,
one might speculate that dislike of gun owners, fueled by opposition to the
exercise of Second Amendment rights, could take the form of dislike,
verging on disgust, toward perceived attributes of gun owners’ broader
identities. But even such disgust, to the extent it exists and is found to
motivate the more extreme gun regulations Professor Charles discusses, does
not reflect the primary-object-centered disgust Professor Nussbaum
discusses, unless one is willing to credit cartoonish pictures of anti-gun
sentiment as resting on elitist disgust toward perceived backwoods
hillbillies. Indeed, even if we further credit that caricature as viewing those
hillbillies as somehow dirty and thus “disgusting,” it remains miles away
from aversion to disabled persons as reminders of our own inevitable death
and decay, not to mention descriptions of gay men’s “typical sexual
practices” as featuring “drinking urine [and] ingesting feces . . . in extremely
unsanitary places.”141 Put more abstractly, while strong opposition to gun
possession might push anti-gun opinion toward viewing gun owners
themselves negatively, those negative views are simply not grounded in
reactions to primary disgust objects that Professor Nussbaum connects to
animus claims as they have developed in constitutional law.
CONCLUSION
Nothing in this Essay is intended to detract from the care and detail with
which Professor Charles states his case against importing animus doctrine
into Second Amendment law. Nor is it even to dispute his conclusion that
better ways exist to enforce the Second Amendment than having animus
colonize Second Amendment jurisprudence, even if his argument omits both
important factual and doctrinal nuances and consideration of the theoretical
foundation of animus.
With regard to those more theoretical conceptions, this Essay’s
examination of Professor Nussbaum’s theory of disgust suggests that her
construct fails to support arguments finding animus in regulations of guns,
gun owners, or gun rights.142 However, even if primary-object disgust-based
141

NUSSBAUM, DISGUST, supra note 2, at 1 (quoting PAUL CAMERON, MEDICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
WHAT HOMOSEXUALS DO).
142 See, e.g., Jarret T. Crawford, Yoel Inbar & Victoria Maloney, Disgust Sensitivity Selectively
Predicts Attitudes Toward Groups that Threaten (or Uphold) Traditional Sexual Morality,
70 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 218, 222 (2014) (concluding, based on empirical research,
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animus is a poor explanation for gun regulation, laws that arguably rest on a
dislike of a perceived group identity may still be vulnerable to animus
claims. Thus, perhaps the main lesson of this Essay’s analysis is that animus
may in fact lurk in situations not easily explainable by her focus on primary
objects of human disgust. The Court’s foundational animus language
certainly suggests as much.143
That lesson does not refute Professor Nussbaum’s theory. However, it
may suggest that her theory appropriately serves as either the core or a subset
of a broader theoretical foundation for animus, with other instantiations of
animus related to her disgust focus, but not precisely explainable by it.144 In
turn, that suggestion calls out for further research about how Professor
Nussbaum’s insights about the disgust foundation for much of what we call
animus relates to other instances of that phenomenon that her insights cannot
fully explain. For example, what is the relationship between disgust reactions
and the social distancing that marks many contemporary xenophobic
attitudes we might label as animus?145 Can disgust help explain government
actions, like the food stamp cutoff in Moreno, that were allegedly motivated
by a desire to punish an identifiable social group? Perhaps most generally,
can disgust help explain racial and other attitudes that scholars have
characterized as socially subordinating?146
that “disgust sensitivity does not simply increase disliking of left-aligned groups (and liking of rightaligned groups) across the board,” including on gun-control and gun-rights issues; “rather, it is selectively
associated with attitudes toward groups associated with sexual morality”).
143 See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (“[I]f the constitutional conception
of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”
(emphasis omitted)).
144 See, e.g., discussion supra note 110 (noting Professor Nussbaum’s ambivalence about whether
ableist attitudes reflect innate or socially constructed disgust reactions).
145 For example, many American communities have experienced situations in which individuals or
groups have heatedly protested the establishment of mosques or the settling of refugees. See, e.g., Chris
McGreal, Ground Zero Mosque Plans ‘Fuelling Anti-Muslim Protests Across US,’ GUARDIAN (Aug. 12,
2010), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/aug/12/ground-zero-mosque-islamophobia [https://
perma.cc/983V-XXP3] (discussing protests to new Islamic centers); Marta Zakrzewska, Jonas K.
Olofsson, Torun Lindholm, Anna Blomkvist & Marco Tullio Liuzza, Body Odor Disgust Sensitivity Is
Associated with Prejudice Toward a Fictive Group of Immigrants, 201 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 221, 221–
22, 224–25 (2019) (finding that body odor disgust sensitivity is positively correlated with xenophobic
reactions to a fictional refugee group, and concluding based on that result that such sensitivity has a weak
positive correlation with xenophobia).
146 See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, DISGUST, supra note 2, at 22–23 (providing examples of “disgust-based
subordination”); NUSSBAUM, HIDING, supra note 2, at 114 (discussing Hindu nationalists’ portrayal of
Indian Muslims as “hypersexual animal beings, whose bodily fertility threatens the control of the pure
Hindu male,” and describing that feeling as “disgust”). The obvious connection between that portrayal
and the analogous portrayal of Black American men suggests the disgust foundation for that latter
portrayal. Marques P. Richeson, Sex, Drugs, and . . . Race-to-Castrate: A Black Box Warning of Chemical
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These questions matter because animus matters. At least as long as
animus doctrine continues to “flourish[]”147 at the Court, it behooves scholars
to continue trying to understand the theoretical foundations of the animus
idea. Indeed, these questions matter regardless of animus doctrine’s ultimate
fate as a matter of constitutional law doctrine. In a world marked
simultaneously by increasing xenophobia and social conflict but also
increasing assertions of new and fluid group identities, attitudes
appropriately labeled as “animus” will continue to arise and exclusionary
laws based on those attitudes will likely continue to be enacted. Locating the
headwaters of those attitudes should matter to the judicial response to those
laws, regardless of the label courts affix to them.148

Castration’s Potential Racial Side Effects, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 95, 117 (2009) (noting mass
media’s portrayal of Black men as hypersexual and sexually aggressive).
147 Charles, supra note 1, at 6.
148 Cf. William D. Araiza, Call It by Its Name, 48 STETSON L. REV. 181, 185–91 (2019) (urging the
Court to label such actions by their appropriate name: animus).
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